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In a popular cinematographer’s trick, a character’s physi-
cal abilities and psychological states are conveyed to 
viewers by distorting the world as seen through the char-
acter’s eyes. When a detective climbs a belltower’s stair-
way in Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo, his environment 
stretches in depth as he peers down in terror at how far 
he could fall. When all-star basketball player Michael 
Jordan leaps from half-court to make an heroic, game-
winning slam dunk in Space Jam, the hoop creeps closer 
to him.
Mounting empirical and theoretical evidence spanning 
nearly two decades of research appears to suggest a strik-
ing perceptual reality to this cinematographic technique. 
According to a rich and influential theory I will call the 
paternalistic vision hypothesis, perception of the environ-
ment’s spatial layout is systematically sensitive to the per-
ceiver’s abilities and purposes. Hills, it is claimed, look 
steeper to observers burdened by heavy backpacks 
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), objects look closer to actors 
whose reach is augmented by a tool (Witt, Proffitt, & 
Epstein, 2005), and heights look higher to those who fear 
them (Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 
2008), just like Vertigo’s detective. Such effects are said to 
facilitate the selection of safe, efficient, successful actions: 
Heavy backpacks make hills harder to climb, so vision 
steepens them to discourage ascent.
If true, the paternalistic vision hypothesis bears deep 
and far-reaching consequences for several issues in per-
ceptual, social, and philosophical psychology. Chief 
among these, it threatens to revise a long-held under-
standing of how—and even why—the visual system 
computes the three-dimensional structure of the world, 
according to which visual processing operates on little 
more than the stimulus information reaching the eyes and 
is stubbornly insulated against states such as the perceiv-
er’s goals, beliefs, or action capabilities (e.g., Fodor, 1983; 
Pylyshyn, 1999). If vision is paternalistic in the way 
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A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment. According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial 
perception, the visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the external world, but instead 
by actively distorting the environment’s perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable outcomes. 
Scores of experimental results have supported this view—including, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack 
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that extant accounts of how and why spatial perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that perceptual 
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suggested, then a new and exciting understanding of 
what perception is—and what it is for—is in order.
Moreover, although it is a virtue of much experimental 
vision research that empirical disputes can often be set-
tled by demonstrations in which the relevant phenomena 
are experienced directly (e.g., illusory contours, change-
blindness, apparent motion), it is widely agreed that this 
route has proven fruitless in the present case. As anyone 
can freely discover, no changes in landscape topography 
are subjectively apparent as one dons and removes a 
backpack—and certainly not to the seismic degree fre-
quently reported (e.g., changes in perceived slant and 
distance of 25%–30%; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, 
Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003). It is precisely 
because “Everyday experience suggests that the percep-
tual world reflects the constant geometric properties of 
the environment” (Proffitt, 2006b, p. 120) that it would be 
all the more earthshaking to discover that the perceptual 
world is ever bending and warping before our eyes.
These considerations offer strong reasons to interrogate 
the paternalistic account of spatial perception. This arti-
cle’s aim is thus to characterize, evaluate, and ultimately 
reject the paternalistic vision hypothesis on the basis of 
several insurmountable difficulties facing it. In particular, 
despite some initial plausibility, extant accounts of how 
and why spatial perception is sensitive to the perceiver’s 
action capabilities fail, and there is no satisfactory solution 
to the challenge from perceptual phenomenology. I con-
clude that the motivation and explanatory framework for 
paternalistic vision are deeply flawed and that the existing 
empirical results can be satisfactorily explained by other 
factors.
The Paternalistic Vision Hypothesis
In a well-known study that has sparked a vibrant research 
program, observers stood at the base of a hill and esti-
mated its slant by adjusting a handheld cross-sectional 
representation of the hill to visually match the real 
hill before them. One group estimated while wearing 
heavy backpacks, and another group viewed the hill 
without backpacks. Remarkably, those observers bur-
dened by backpacks judged the hill to be approximately 
5° steeper than did the unencumbered observers (Bhalla 
& Proffitt, 1999).
Various manipulations and dependent measures have 
since yielded similarly striking results. Wearing a heavy 
backpack inflates estimates of egocentric distance to 
objects (Proffitt et al., 2003), as does throwing a heavy 
ball before estimating (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). 
Fatigued or physically unfit individuals overestimate slant 
and distance relative to rested or fit individuals (Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 
1995; Sugovic & Witt, 2011; see also Witt et al., 2009), 
fixing weights to subjects’ ankles increases size estimates 
of a jumpable gap (Lessard, Linkenauger, & Proffitt, 
2009), holding one’s arms out to one’s sides decreases 
width estimates of doorway-like apertures (Stefanucci & 
Geuss, 2009), and standing on a wobbly balancing board 
reduces width estimates of a walkable beam (Geuss, 
Stefanucci, de Benedictis-Kessner, & Stevens, 2010). 
Conversely, subjects who wield reach-extending conduc-
tor’s batons judge targets to be closer (Witt et al., 2005), 
and subjects who drink a sugary beverage such as Coca-
Cola (rather than no-calorie Coke Zero) estimate hills to 
be shallower (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010). Hot-hitting 
batters report bigger softballs (Gray, in press; Witt & 
Proffitt, 2005), successful field-goal kickers report wider 
football uprights (Witt & Dorsch, 2009), shot-making ten-
nis players report lower nets (Witt & Sugovic, 2010), 
accurate dart-throwers report larger targets (Cañal-
Bruland, Pijpers, & Oudejans, 2010; Wesp, Cichello, 
Gracia, & Davis, 2004), and golfers who have had a favor-
able day on the green report larger golf holes (Witt, 
Linkenauger, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2008). Swimmers judge 
underwater targets to be closer when wearing speedy 
flippers than when barefoot (Witt, Schuck, & Taylor, 
2011), and individuals trained in the urban acrobatic 
sport parkour give shorter estimates of a wall’s height 
than do untrained individuals (Taylor, Witt, & Sugovic, 
2011).
These and many more results have inspired the pro-
posal that visual perception distorts the world according 
to the perceiver’s abilities and purposes—what I will call 
the paternalistic vision hypothesis (for reviews, see 
Proffitt, 2006b, 2008; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 
2011a). The modifier paternalistic is for this theory’s pic-
ture of the visual system as a teller of well-intentioned 
white lies about the world, so as to bias perceivers toward 
favorable actions. As vividly put by Proffitt (2006b), “A 
principal function of perception is to defend people from 
having to think” (p. 119).1
This imputed function of paternalistic visual systems—
to assist their owners in selecting actions—itself plays a 
central role in supporting the broader hypothesis. 
Embedding information about ability into the perceived 
spatial world supposedly confers “adaptive advantages” 
(Proffitt, 2006b, p. 119; Witt, 2011a, p. 204) on perceivers 
by taking on some of the cognitive heavy lifting in select-
ing actions. For example, a prospective hill-climber 
blessed with paternalistic vision could choose to climb 
only those hills appearing shallower than, say, 20° and 
then leave the rest to the visual system: If the backpack 
is prohibitively heavy or if sugar stores are prohibitively 
low, vision will intervene and steepen the hill to exceed 
an invariant climbability-specifying critical grade, ensur-
ing that the perceiver “does not have to relate perception 
to potential for action because this has already been 
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achieved in perception” (Proffitt, 2008, p. 181). In this 
way, it is suggested, there is good reason for perception 
to operate paternalistically.
The “ability-scaling” account
So far, I have very briefly sketched what paternalistic 
vision is supposed to do, and why it might be supposed 
to do it. In recent years, the theoretical picture has been 
rounded out by an account of how paternalistic vision is 
actually achieved by the visual system. The central prem-
ise of this account, which will be revisited in much 
greater detail, is that the body provides the visual system 
with a bounty of so-called “perceptual rulers” with which 
to measure up the world and that changes in ability, per-
formance, intention, and arousal can expand and con-
tract the rulers and thereby alter the perceived spatial 
properties of the environment (Lessard et al., 2009; 
Linkenauger, Ramenzoni, & Proffitt, 2010; Linkenauger, 
Witt, & Proffitt, 2011; Linkenauger, Witt, Stefanucci, 
Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2009; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; 
Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009, 2010; Stefanucci & Storbeck, 
2009; Witt, 2011b; Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2010; Witt 
et al., 2011). The proposal is explicitly modeled on prom-
inent accounts of body-based scaling in size and distance 
perception—for example, scaling by eye height (e.g., 
Mark, 1987; Ooi, Wu, & He, 2001; Sedgwick, 1986; Warren 
& Whang, 1987; Wraga, 1999; Wu, Ooi, & He, 2004). Eye-
height scaling accounts hold that the visual system mea-
sures the sizes and distances of viewed objects against 
the altitude of the observer’s eyes, yielding values for 
spatial properties in eye-level units. (A nearby tree, for 
example, could be 3 eye-heights high and 10 eye-heights 
away.) One strength of eye-height scaling accounts is the 
explanation they offer for some intuitive phenomenologi-
cal data relating to size and distance experience. To bor-
row Bennett’s (2011) insightful examples, consider the 
common observation that childhood haunts seem smaller 
when revisited later in life, or the intuitively plausible 
portrayal of spatial experience in films such as Honey, I 
Shrunk the Kids, in which characters zapped by “shrink 
rays” experience football-field-sized backyards and gar-
gantuan family pets. Eye-height scaling offers a ready 
explanation of such phenomena: Now that we are, say, 
twice as tall, the childhood jungle gym is half as many 
eye-heights high; and for the newly diminutive movie 
characters, the backyard is hundreds of eye-heights long. 
These perceiver-environment relations are then reflected 
in visuospatial experience of size and distance: The jun-
gle gym looks smaller now than it did years ago because 
it looks fewer “copies-of-me” in size.
The innovative proposal of the paternalistic vision 
hypothesis is that there exists a multitude of “perceptual 
rulers” like eye-height, furnished by the body and applied 
to the world to “transform the manifest angles of visual 
information into proportions of a particular aspect of 
one’s phenotype” (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013, p. 179). 
The additional rulers, however, are based on abilities 
(“phenotype” is construed rather broadly, as we will see). 
Whereas eye height may be relevant “when intending to 
walk under a low branch” (p. 180), different actions 
would call for different rulers. For example, “when a per-
ceiver intends to reach, optical information is scaled by 
the perceiver’s ability to reach” (Witt, 2011b, p. 1154). 
And such reach-length scaling would yield distance in 
units of arm’s reach, so that if the reach-length perceptual 
ruler were lengthened (e.g., by grasping a baton)—as if 
pulling apart its “tick marks”—extents in depth would 
register smaller values in reach-length units and would 
thereby look closer.
If the action capabilities of the body are expanded, 
then the perceptual ruler is expanded as well. 
Consequently, the object at the same physical 
distance will appear to be closer because the 
distance to the target measures as shorter on the 
expanded ruler (Linkenauger, Witt, et al., 2011,  
p. 1433).
The proposal is less an analogy with eye-height scal-
ing than an elaboration and extension of such accounts. 
The claim is that the same kinds of principles at work 
making objects look smaller as we grow taller are also 
operative in, for example, making objects look closer as 
our reach grows longer.
Importantly, these additional perceptual rulers are not 
meant to be restricted to literal parts of the body. Reach-
length is offered as an example of an action boundary 
(following Fajen, 2005), the maximum extent at which an 
action is possible. Another action boundary could be 
maximum jump length. If the maximum extent of one’s 
standing broad jump is used to “scale” a potentially jump-
able gap, then when a perceiver’s maximum jump length 
decreases (e.g., by wearing ankle weights; Lessard et al., 
2009), the gap would register more units on the jump-
length ruler—and so, the story goes, look farther away. It 
is also suggested that scaling metrics need not be extents 
at all, so that even the amount of effort required to per-
form some action, such as walking across a field to an 
object, could be used to scale the object’s distance, as if 
a metabolic “fuel gauge” (Schnall et al., 2010; p. 467) 
measured the energetic costs of walking to the object and 
returned the distance in units of required energy expen-
diture (perhaps as a proportion of total available energy). 
Finally, it is proposed that space can be scaled by behav-
ior, as in the case of athletic skill. For example, consis-
tently successful golfers who have a high probability of 
making a putt (and low variability in their shots’ direc-
tions) are said to report bigger holes because “The vari-
ance of probability distributions can act as a scaling 
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metric for the apparent sizes of goal-directed targets”; for 
better golfers, “the hole measures as larger on the more 
compact distribution” and so looks bigger (Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013, p. 189; Witt et al., 2008). For tidiness, 
these various proposed scaling operations will collec-
tively be referred to here as ability scaling.
Making the case against paternalistic 
vision
Revolutions in our understanding of the visual system 
have become increasingly rare with time; but the pater-
nalistic vision hypothesis uniquely and boldly threatens 
several pillars of contemporary perceptual psychology. 
Vision science has made real progress in understanding 
the cognitive processes underlying much of spatial per-
ception, but the sophisticated and successful computa-
tional models of capacities such as the perception of 
depth and three-dimensional structure do not include 
terms for the weight on the perceiver’s shoulders or the 
ability to hit a baseball. Moreover, there are deep empiri-
cal and theoretical reasons to think that vision does not 
submit to coercion from extraperceptual influences such 
as a perceiver’s wall-climbing ability or her fear of heights 
(e.g., Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999), a notion directly chal-
lenged by the paternalistic vision hypothesis. Similar 
reverberations have been felt in social and philosophical 
psychology, where the notion that perception itself may 
be “embodied” has become an exciting possibility for 
similar theories of cognition at large (e.g., Balcetis & 
Dunning, 2010; Cole, Balcetis, & Zhang, 2013; Goldman, 
2012; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012; Stefanucci, 
Gagnon, & Lessard, 2011; Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 
2008). These implications make the paternalistic vision 
hypothesis interesting, important, and profoundly conse-
quential. However, they also call for a type and degree of 
scrutiny that has yet to be applied.
The paternalistic vision hypothesis holds that per-
ceived spatial layout is systematically sensitive to the per-
ceiver’s action capabilities, that such sensitivity is achieved 
by scaling operations of a kind with eye-height scaling of 
space, and that paternalistic perceptual effects simplify 
action planning, relieving perceivers of having to reason 
about their abilities and steering them toward advisable 
behavior. In what follows, I will argue (in reverse order) 
that each of these claims—the what, how, and why of 
paternalistic vision—is false; indeed, at least some of 
them must be false.
“Why”: Insufficiently Paternalistic 
Vision
Paternalistic vision’s imputed, “highly adaptive” (Schnall 
et al., 2010; p. 466) function is to inform perceivers of 
their action capabilities by distorting spatial experience 
of the environment, updating the perceptual world to 
match the perceiver’s ability to act on it. But a first strike 
against such purported usefulness is that, as an empirical 
matter, paternalistic vision seems to carry out this duty 
rather ineptly.
Argument 1: Paternalistic perceptual 
effects are the wrong size for the job
Most of the focus on the paternalistic vision program’s 
findings has been on their direction. Wearing a backpack 
increases slant estimates, wielding a baton decreases dis-
tance estimates, etc., and this seems to suggest that vision 
distorts the environment according to the perceiver’s 
abilities. However, to support the paternalistic vision 
hypothesis in particular, the magnitude of these effects is 
just as important. For to successfully “defend people from 
having to think” about their abilities, the visual system 
should distort the perceived environment in a manner 
proportionate with changes in the perceiver’s ability—to 
convey, with at least some degree of accuracy, how much 
the perceiver’s ability has changed, over and above the 
mere sign of the change. However, in the actual empirical 
cases on record, paternalistic vision has turned in an 
underwhelming performance.
To take one example of many, it has been reported 
that positioning one’s hands 115 cm apart reduces width 
estimates of a potentially passable aperture (Stefanucci & 
Geuss, 2009). This effect supposedly serves to inform 
newly widened perceivers that the apertures have 
become less passable and thereby to discourage attempts 
at passage. But the data themselves tell this story far less 
compellingly. For all but the broadest-shouldered among 
us, 115 cm constitutes a doubling or tripling of our bod-
ies’ widest dimension and renders impassable nearly 
every doorway we would ever encounter. One might 
expect, then, that any changes in perceived aperture 
width following this manipulation would be commensu-
rate with its drastic and consequential reduction in aper-
ture-passing ability. However, the observed compression 
in perceived aperture width was only 3%! Although in the 
appropriate direction, an effect of this magnitude is much 
too modest to assist anyone actually interested in walk-
ing through an aperture. Consider even the subjects in 
the aperture-width study itself (Stefanucci & Geuss, 
2009), who viewed apertures ranging from 76 cm 
in width (roughly that of a typical interior door) up to 
152 cm. Any of these apertures would have been easily 
passable for the average person; however, upon reposi-
tioning subjects’ arms 115 cm apart, more than half of the 
presented apertures became impassable. A mere 3% 
reduction in perceived width simply does not communi-
cate this fact to the perceiver: An aperture that looks 
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100 cm wide also looks (and is) just as passable as one 
that looks 97 cm wide. But in fact, most of the presented 
apertures went from being easily passable to being decid-
edly impassable when subjects’ hand positions were 
widened.
Such severe miscalibration carries immediate practical 
consequences. Paternalistic vision supposedly allows 
organisms to base action decisions on constant values of 
perceived spatial extents, working behind the scenes to 
ensure that the perceived environment literally bends 
to maintain the viability of a particular action-decision 
strategy (e.g., Proffitt, 2008). For example, perceivers 
endowed with paternalistic vision can supposedly choose 
to attempt passage only through doorways appearing, 
say, 60 cm or more in width, relying on their visual sys-
tems to appropriately distort the aperture when their 
effective body width changes. But the actual empirical 
results suggest that anyone who dares to take this coun-
sel will collide with their fair share of doorways.
This is one case of many in service of the same point. 
Another is the finding that increasing reaching extent by 
more than 50% (by means of a 39-cm baton) reportedly 
caused only a 5% reduction in perceived distance to 
potentially reachable targets (Witt et al., 2005). In another, 
multiplying “apparent grasping ability” by a factor of 
3.5—a 250% increase—reportedly decreased the per-
ceived size of graspable objects by only 5% (Linkenauger, 
Witt, et al., 2011). And in other cases, the effects may 
even be too large. For example, subjects who drank 
250 ml of a juice beverage containing natural sugars and 
artificial sweeteners judged a hill to have a grade more 
than 50% steeper than did subjects who drank 250 ml of 
a sugar-sweetened version of the beverage (Schnall et al., 
2010)—a difference in perceived slope equivalent to 
nearly twice the grade of San Francisco’s steepest ave-
nues.2 If, as advertised, these effects are genuinely per-
ceptual, then paternalistic vision radically (and often 
treacherously) misleads perceivers about their abilities.
Note that this is not meant as an empirical worry; that 
is, the concern is not that the effects fail to meet some 
particular experimental prediction of, for example, a 
“scaling” approach. There are, after all, many cues to 
visual size and distance, not all of which need be sensi-
tive to ability (see Witt et al., 2005, who make this point 
as well). Instead, the present worry is that paternalistic 
vision is not paternalistic enough to do its intended job. 
If “simplified action planning is an adaptive consequence 
of seeing the world in terms of costs and benefits” 
because “seeing these costs in the world eliminates or 
reduces the need to explicitly deduce their influence” 
(Proffitt, 2006b, p. 119), then it is incumbent on paternal-
istic vision to represent the extent of these costs—and to 
do so on at least the appropriate order of magnitude. 
That paternalistic visual systems of the kind evidenced by 
the empirical literature rather spectacularly fail to 
accomplish this, and even mislead perceivers about what 
they can and cannot do, directly undermines the primary 
motivation for engaging in such spatial distortions in the 
first place.
Argument 2: Action-specific units are 
incommensurable
Despite inadequately advising perceivers about whether 
to perform a particular action, paternalistic vision could 
still be thought useful elsewhere. Indeed, it is often 
claimed that paternalistic vision can facilitate selection 
between actions that could fulfill some goal, by revealing 
the most advisable action through perceptual distortions 
(e.g., Proffitt, 2006b). However, this proposal, too, is 
untenable; in fact, it is undermined precisely by other 
assumptions of the paternalistic vision hypothesis.
As reviewed earlier, the paternalistic vision hypothesis 
holds that the perceived sizes, distances, and slants of 
objects and surfaces derive from the ability-based per-
ceptual rulers that measure them, yielding values for 
those spatial properties in intrinsic, ability-based units: 
arm lengths, jump extents, calories, and the rest of the 
perceptual-ruler panoply. The idea is, roughly, that 
the content of one’s spatial-perceptual experiences—say, 
the perceptual experience of distance—is something like 
“that object is 10 times as far away as I am tall” or “as 
my reach is long” or “as I can walk at a cost of 5 calo-
ries.” As ability-scaling theorists perspicuously put it, 
“The meaning of an extent is grounded in the metric to 
which it is scaled” (Linkenauger, Witt, et al., 2011, p. 
1433).
However, this formulation raises a worry about pater-
nalistic vision’s ability to inform decisions between pro-
spective actions: If spatial extents are experienced in the 
proprietary units of each action’s perceptual ruler (arm-
lengths, calories, etc.), then there would seem to be an 
in-principle difficulty in comparing the values returned 
by each ruler’s measurement, so as to decide between 
actions.
To illustrate, suppose a perceiver wishes to retrieve a 
nearby object and can either reach for the object or walk 
to the object. A straightforward-seeming question for the 
paternalistic vision hypothesis is as follows: How should 
this perceiver settle on one action rather than the other? 
At first, the answer seems equally straightforward: The 
perceiver should simply compare the output of each scal-
ing operation (reaching and walking), and then choose 
the action for which the corresponding perceptual ruler 
returns the smaller value. The action for which the object 
is represented as closer would seem to be the appropri-
ate choice.
But the situation is not so simple. The insight of ability 
scaling is supposed to be that the various “action- 
specific” perceptual rulers return the environment’s 
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spatial properties in different units: The perceptual ruler 
for reaching returns distance in units “specific” to reach-
ing (e.g., reach lengths), whereas the perceptual ruler for 
walking returns distance in units specific to walking (e.g., 
footsteps, required walking effort). But if that’s right, then 
each action-specific perceptual ruler’s proprietary units 
would be incommensurable with one another; one could 
say there is no “conversion rate” from one unit type to 
another. In that case, it would turn out that neither ruler 
represented the object as closer, because each ruler 
would represent distance in different, intrinsic, action-
specific units.
Proponents of paternalistic vision themselves appeal 
to the incommensurability of action-specific perceptual 
units, albeit in a different context. In repelling a version 
of the objection that perceptual phenomenology fails to 
reveal paternalistic perceptual effects, it is often con-
tended that we should never have expected to see the 
world bend every which way as our intended actions 
change, because no comparison can be made between 
the values returned by different perceptual rulers. A 
reacher, it is suggested, experiences the world just plain 
differently than a walker does, and the two experiences 
(distance in arm lengths vs. distance in walking effort) 
simply are not comparable (see also Proffitt, 2008; Proffitt 
& Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, Proffitt, et al., 2010). Setting 
aside the success of this reply, it does seem right to assert 
this kind of unit incommensurability. But if action-specific 
units cannot be compared in introspective searches for 
paternalistic perceptual effects, then neither can they be 
compared in selecting among potential actions.
One might object here that, at bottom, only one kind 
of perceptual unit is relevant to paternalistic vision: 
energy expenditure. Why not think that the visual sys-
tem always represents spatial extents according to the 
caloric cost of acting on them, which would allow per-
ceivers to choose the action that makes the target look 
“fewer calories away”? The answer is that this response 
underestimates the impressive breadth of results gener-
ated by the paternalistic vision research program; it sim-
ply is not true that all (or even most) of the relevant 
empirical findings concern energetic costs. One class of 
particularly clear counterexamples involves the effects of 
otherwise-unrelated mental states on spatial judgments. 
For example, imagining a close friend decreases slant 
estimates just as consuming a sugary beverage does, 
supposedly because of increased social support (Schnall, 
Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008); fear, perceived dan-
ger, arousal, and mood influence estimates of altitude, 
size, and slant (Geuss et al., 2010; Riener, Stefanucci, 
Proffitt, & Clore, 2011; Stefanucci, Gagnon, Tompkins, & 
Bullock, 2012; Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009; Stefanucci, 
Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008; Stefanucci & Storbeck, 
2009; Teachman et al., 2008); and even witnessing 
another person successfully intercept a virtual ball in the 
computer game Pong decreases estimates of the ball’s 
speed (Witt, Sugovic, & Taylor, 2012). Energy consider-
ations are neither here nor there in these cases. Likewise, 
when athletes who are “in the zone” supposedly experi-
ence bigger softballs (Witt & Proffitt, 2005), wider foot-
ball uprights (Witt & Dorsch, 2009), and larger golf holes 
(Witt et al., 2008), the assumption is not that less energy 
is required at that moment to, for example, boot the 
football between the uprights; it is that the kicker is 
more accurate. This may apply to even the most basic 
ability manipulations (e.g., Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009; 
Witt et al., 2005), which seem to be less about the energy 
required for an action than the likelihood of that action’s 
success. An approach based exclusively on required 
energy expenditure would thus be too crude a charac-
terization of such heterogeneous empirical results, and 
so it fails to solve the incommensurability problem.3
Choices between actions that could each fulfill a goal 
are commonplace, and paternalistic vision might have 
assisted in such situations (Proffitt, 2006b). However, to 
successfully defend people from having to think about 
the best course of action available to them, paternalistic 
visual systems must be equipped to compare available 
options. If action-specific units are incommensurable, 
then they cannot fulfill this essential purpose.
“How”: The Lawlessness of Ability 
Scaling
Even if paternalistic visual systems do not serve their 
owners very well, compelling empirical evidence with 
appropriate theoretical backing could nevertheless con-
vincingly support the broader hypothesis (although it 
would remain unclear why spatial perception should 
work that way in the first place). To that end, the ability-
scaling approach marks a leap forward in accounting for 
how the visual system carries out the perceptual resizing 
of space so extensively catalogued over nearly two 
decades. Advertised as the theoretical synthesis that 
will integrate and explain the collection of otherwise-
disparate findings reviewed thus far, the ability-scaling 
perspective has been especially well articulated in recent 
years (Lessard et al., 2009; Linkenauger et al., 2009; 
Linkenauger et al., 2010; Linkenauger, Witt, et al., 2011; 
Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009, 
2010; Stefanucci & Storbeck, 2009; Witt, 2011b; Witt, 
Proffitt, et al., 2010; Witt et al., 2011) and has already 
influenced the broader research community, directly 
motivating several new studies and analyses (e.g., Cañal-
Bruland, Pijpers, & Oudejans, 2012; de Grave, Brenner, & 
Smeets, 2011; Kirsch, Herbort, Butz, & Kunde, 2012; 
Kirsch & Kunde, in press; Lee, Lee, Carello, & Turvey, 
2012; Osiurak, Morgado, & Palluel-Germain, 2012). The 
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central thesis is succinctly summarized by Witt (2011b): 
“perception is a function of scaling optical information to 
the perceiver’s abilities” (p. 1155).
However, the appeal to perceptual scaling is a red 
herring. Lurking behind discussions of scaling space by 
ability is a deep and fatal disanalogy between the ability-
scaling account and its claimed theoretical precursors. In 
particular, this section argues that the ability-scaling 
account critically lacks an informational basis of the sort 
that grounds successful scaling accounts in size and dis-
tance perception and that several of the proposed scaling 
metrics are inappropriate candidates in principle for the 
units of spatial perception. These difficulties irreparably 
undermine the only mechanism so far put forward as an 
explanation of paternalistic vision.
Eye-height scaling of size and distance
It will sharpen this issue to briefly review work on eye-
height scaling of size and distance (the paradigmatic per-
ceptual ruler), which the paternalistic vision hypothesis 
elaborates and extends to flesh out its ability-scaling 
approach. Some familiarity with these ideas should high-
light the necessary ingredients of a successful scaling 
account, so that it is exceedingly clear just what is miss-
ing from accounts of scaling space by abilities.
Consider first scaling perceived size by the so-called 
horizon ratio, the original theoretical development of 
eye-height scaling (see Sedgwick, 1986). The simple, cen-
tral insight of this account is that the horizon appears to 
each observer at eye level, thereby marking the observ-
er’s own eye height on any object she sees, irrespective 
of viewing distance. This convenient fact of optical geom-
etry allows the visual system to use simple angular rela-
tions to determine an object’s size in eye-level units, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 (A and B). Because D is the angular 
extent of the portion of the object above the horizon (A), 
and E is the angular extent of the portion of the object 
below the horizon (B), many relations between D and E 
also hold between A and B. For instance, the ratio of the 
full object’s angular extent (D+ E) to the angular extent 
of the object’s below-horizon portion (E) is equal to the 
ratio of the full object’s size (A + B) to the size of the 
object’s below-horizon portion (B). Expressed as an 
equation,4 this relationship is
                      (A + B)/B = (D + E)/E (1)
However, because the horizon (whether directly visi-
ble or instead implied, e.g., by a bifurcation in optic flow) 
cuts objects at eye level, the object’s below-horizon por-
tion (B) is equal in size to the observer’s own eye height 
(H). This allows us to substitute H for B, so that the ratio 
of object size to eye height is given by (D+ E)/E (the 
so-called horizon ratio):
                      (A + B)/H = (D+ E)/E (2)
or
                    Size/H = the horizon ratio (3)
By definition, H = 1 eye-level unit for any observer, 
leaving us with a simple expression of visual size in eye-
level units, based on prevailing optical information: Size, 
in eye-level units, is given by the horizon ratio. All the 
visual system must do is detect the angles of inclination 
(D) and declination (E) from the horizon to the object’s 
top and bottom, and eye-height-scaled size can be easily 
determined.
Eye-height-scaled distance is even simpler. In Figure 1c, 
distance to a target (D) is the base of a right triangle, and 
eye height (H) is the triangle’s height. Note also the dec-
lination angle from the horizon to the target’s base, and 
its complementary angle (T). By a basic trigonometric 
relation:
                          D/H = tan(T) (4)
As before, H = 1 by definition, so the distance to the 
target, in eye-level units, is given simply by tan(T). Thus, 
given only the declination angle to a target, the visual 
system can determine the distance to that target in eye-
level units.
It now becomes clear why, for example, shorter 
observers might perceive objects to be larger and 
taller observers might perceive objects to be closer. For 
shorter observers, the horizon cuts objects lower to the 
ground (Fig. 1B), increasing the horizon ratio by increas-
ing D and decreasing E. Because the horizon ratio just is 
size in eye-level units, Eq. 3 returns a larger value for size. 
Conversely, taller observers have a steeper declination 
angle and therefore a smaller T and tan(T). Tan(T) just is 
distance in eye-level units, so for taller observers, a 
smaller value is returned for eye-height-scaled distance. 
(And observers indeed underestimate distance when 
wearing prism goggles that deflect the apparent declina-
tion angle further below the horizon; Ooi et al., 2001.)
All of this exposition is to make clear the following 
moral: Growing taller does not by itself make objects 
look smaller or closer. Rather, growing taller changes 
the point at which the horizon cuts objects (for size) and 
the declination angle to targets (for distance). Growing 
taller, of course, entails that objects are in fact fewer eye-
heights away and tall, but the visual system can discover 
this only because growing taller has the right kind of 
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optical consequences. And not just any optical conse-
quences will do: To support perceptual scaling, changes 
in the scaling metric must leave the kind of informational 
traces that allow the to-be-scaled spatial property to be 
expressed in units of the scaling metric and determined 
by the visual system. Most precisely, what enables the 
visual system to scale size and distance by eye-height is 
the existence of lawful supporting relations between, on 
the one hand, optic-array structures (angles and ratios 
of angles, optical velocities, etc.), and, on the other 
hand, eye-height-scaled size or distance. The possibility 
of constructing equations such as 3 and 4, which 
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Fig. 1. Eye-height scaling. Eye-height scaling of size is grounded by the horizon ratio (A). For observers 
of different eye heights, the horizon cuts objects at different points, changing the value of the horizon 
ratio (B). The declination angle to a target (or its complementary angle, T) can be used to scale distance 
in eye-level units (C).
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articulate these relations between space in body-scaled 
units and the prevailing visual information, forms the 
bedrock of any account of the visual scaling of space.
Argument 3: Ability scaling is 
informationally ungrounded
The paternalistic vision hypothesis contends that we have 
vastly underestimated the stock of perceptual rulers used 
to scale spatial layout and that the overlooked rulers are 
based on effort, energy level, action boundaries, athletic 
skill, and even arousal. This seems to be a wise and for-
ward-thinking insight: If the sound principles supporting 
eye-height scaling predict perceptual consequences for 
size and distance experience, then perhaps those same 
principles could figure in accounts of jump-height scal-
ing, reach-length scaling, golf-skill scaling, and height-
fear scaling and thereby offer similar explanations for 
the effects observed in the paternalistic vision studies. 
However, this apparent insight is illusory. As emphasized, 
there are (at least) two essential ingredients to a success-
ful account of spatial-perceptual scaling: a proposed 
scaling metric, and a way to relate that scaling metric 
to the information specifying the to-be-scaled spatial 
property—a way to express the spatial property in units 
of the scaling metric through transformations on 
the information available to vision. The ability-scaling 
account has the former in spades—but in no case does it 
appear to have (or pursue) the latter.
The most straightforward reason, then, to think that 
the visual system does not scale space by ability in the 
way required for paternalistic vision is simply that there 
do not appear to be any appropriate relations between, 
on the one hand, the stimulus information reaching the 
visual system and, on the other hand, size, distance, 
height, or slant in ability-based units. In other words, 
there are no analogs to Eqs. 3 and 4 for size or distance 
in walking-effort units, glucose-level units, baseball-skill 
units, reaching-ability units, height-fear units, and so 
forth.
To illustrate, return to Figure 1, but now suppose the 
depicted observers wish to jump over (or toward) the 
objects before them (Lessard et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 
2011). Linkenauger, Witt, et al. (2011) explicitly consider 
such a scenario: For a trekker approaching a crevasse, 
“the width of the crevasse would be perceived as a pro-
portion of the maximum extent over which one can 
jump” (p. 1433). Ability-scaling theorists hold that “the 
visually perceived environment is fully specified by visual 
information” and that “the angular units of visual infor-
mation must be transformed into units appropriate for 
the specification of such parameters of surface layout as 
extent, size, and orientation” (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 
2013, p. 171–172). And they very clearly take the function 
of perceptual rulers to be carrying out these 
transformations: “Perceptual rulers transform visual 
angles into extent-appropriate units” (p. 179). By all 
accounts, then, the job of the jumping-ability ruler is to 
“transform” units of angular extent into units of jumping 
ability, just as the eye-height ruler transformed units of 
angular extent into units of eye-height.
But how will the visual system pull this off? We know 
how the angular size of viewed objects (D+ E) can be 
converted into eye-height units (just divide by E), and we 
know the same for ground-surface extents (apply the 
tangent relation). But what is the nature of the transfor-
mation from a viewed object’s angular size to its size in 
units of jumping ability? An answer is not forthcoming in 
any discussion of paternalistic vision, and neither is it 
clear in its own right. There are simply no appropriate 
relations holding between size and distance in jumping-
ability units and the visual angles subtended by objects 
and extents. Fixing weights to subjects’ ankles does, of 
course, affect jumping ability, but not in a way that makes 
the right kind of imprint (if any) on the visual informa-
tion specifying size or distance. But if that is the case, 
then it cannot be true that “the action capabilities of the 
body can provide perceptual rulers with which to trans-
form manifest visual angles into extent-appropriate units” 
(Linkenauger, Witt, et al., 2011, p. 1433), whether for 
jumping ability or for any other of the myriad proposed 
ability-based scaling metrics.
Instances of spatial-perceptual scaling are solutions to 
problems—for example, problems of perceptual indeter-
minacy. They help observers determine how far away or 
how big environmental objects are from otherwise-
ambiguous visual information such as angular extent. 
This is what makes so puzzling the persistent contention 
that “individuals perceive sizes and distances as a propor-
tion of the action-relevant aspect of their phenotype” 
(Linkenauger, Witt, et al., 2011, p. 1433, emphasis added; 
see also Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2011b; 
Witt et al., 2004, 2005; Witt, Proffitt, et al., 2010), such that 
eye-height scaling, for example, is useful only in circum-
stances such as “intending to walk under a low branch” 
(Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013, p. 180). Eye-height scaling 
is a general solution to the problem of determining size 
and distance, and it could have evolved in a branch-less 
world. Note, for example, that the lack of overhead 
obstacles or any other action-relevant uses for eye-height 
in Figure 1C hardly detracts from the declination-angle 
account’s applicability. No action requires expressing the 
distance to a far-off object in units of copies-of-myself-
arranged-head-to-toe-along-the-ground—and yet appar-
ently we use such eye-height-based distance cues (e.g., 
Ooi et al., 2001). This is certainly no suggestion that abil-
ity-scaling theorists are unaware of these aspects of scal-
ing accounts (see especially Dixon, Wraga, Proffitt, & 
Williams, 2000; Proffitt, 2006a; Wraga & Proffitt, 2000); 
however, such accounts do seem mishandled for the 
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present purposes. No information about visual size in 
ability-scaled units is out there to be detected in the first 
place.5
The difficulties with ungroundedness only intensify 
from here. Although the informational basis for scaling 
size or distance by these metrics is unknown at best, 
cases such as reach-length scaling and jumping-ability 
scaling should be among the easiest cases for the ability-
scaling approach to handle. We should at least expect to 
recognize a successful jump-length scaling account if 
presented with one. But how will space come to be 
scaled by metrics such as walking energy, golfing vari-
ability, or emotional arousal? (The very suggestion is 
something of a category error: “Perceptual” or otherwise, 
unit rulers have the physical quantities they measure.) 
And what of metrics that uncontroversially leave no infor-
mational traces whatsoever? It has been reported that 
merely imagining reaching with a baton compresses per-
ceived distance just as well as actually picking one up 
and reaching with it (Witt & Proffitt, 2008; see also Davoli, 
Brockmole, & Witt, 2012). Such findings alone should 
sufficiently refute the ability-scaling account as an expla-
nation of the paternalistic vision findings: Needless to 
say, imagined batons do not impinge on the retina, per-
turb optic flow, or correlate with other scalable body 
units; therefore, they are of no use as perceptual rulers.6
The challenge to the ability-scaling approach is 
straightforward. If we are to take seriously the contention 
that “optical and ocular-motor information is scaled and 
transformed by action-specific influences into percep-
tions of spatial layout” (Witt, Proffitt, et al., 2010, p. 1159), 
then we need relations similar to Eqs. 3 and 4, with opti-
cal information on one side and a given spatial property 
expressed in units of a given action capability on the 
other. What is the nature of that transformation for the 
myriad proposed ability-based scaling metrics, from 
jump-length scaling to golfing-variability scaling to 
arousal-based scaling? Without an answer, the appeal to 
perceptual scaling is a distraction that fails to account for 
paternalistic vision.7
“What”: Paternalistic Vision and 
Perceptual Phenomenology
Argument 4: Paternalistic perceptual 
effects are not subjectively noticeable 
(and they should be)
Adventurous readers may have noted that several experi-
ments reviewed thus far can easily be tried out at home. 
Anyone unimpressed by theoretical wrangling can take 
matters into their own hands and settle any dispute over 
paternalistic vision for at least their own case: Simply 
grab the nearest backpack, drink some Coca-Cola, or just 
raise your arms out to your sides, and look around. Such 
an undertaking is made easier by reports that mere imag-
ined tool-augmented reaching elicits distance-compres-
sion effects similar to actual tool-augmented reaching 
(e.g., Witt & Proffitt, 2008). So take a moment to try some 
of these tasks for yourself; do such exercises deliver the 
expected phenomenology?8
These do-it-yourself experiments never seem to work 
on me, and I suspect that others will have similar luck. 
But one need not submit to extraordinary manipulations 
to find support for the claim that perceptual phenome-
nology fails to corroborate paternalistic vision—the 
view’s proponents themselves implicitly concede the 
point, by framing the relevant findings to be at odds with 
introspection. In motivating the novelty of the paternalis-
tic vision results, for example, it is often pointed out that 
“Everyday experience suggests that the perceptual world 
reflects the constant geometric properties of the environ-
ment” (Proffitt, 2006b, p. 120; see also Schnall et al., 
2010). But while such statements indeed highlight the 
surprisingness of the findings, they also expose a prob-
lem for the broader view: If the perceptual world is 
always warping before our eyes, then why don’t we 
notice it?
To be sure, perceptual experiences can be different 
without being discernibly different. But the putative 
effects of paternalistic vision possess several telltale char-
acteristics of otherwise noticeable perceptual phenom-
ena: They are often quite large (25%–50%; Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999; Davoli et al., 2012; Proffitt et al., 2003; 
Riener et al., 2011; Schnall et al., 2010; Stefanucci et al., 
2008), they occur precisely where subjects are attending 
in space, they affect precisely the features to which sub-
jects are attending, and the objects supposedly undergo-
ing such changes can be studied for as long as one 
wishes. Such considerations undermine a common 
response that everyday obliviousness to a warping per-
ceptual world could be explained by a phenomenon like 
change blindness, wherein substantial changes to visual 
scenes can go undetected in certain circumstances 
(Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons, Franconeri, & 
Reimer, 2000; Simons & Levin, 1998). The central lesson 
of change blindness is that attention is its antidote: If you 
know what to look for and where to look for it, you can 
attend accordingly and see the change every time. The 
paternalistic vision hypothesis assumes, plausibly, that 
perceivers considering an action (e.g., climbing a hill) 
attend to the very property (slant) of the very item (the 
hill) supposedly undergoing substantial perceptual 
change. So, although some account of our ignorance to 
the constant and considerable resizing of the perceptual 
world is indeed needed for paternalistic vision to remain 
phenomenologically plausible, change blindness is not it.
Interestingly, there is one—and only one—reported 
case of a subjectively noticeable paternalistic perceptual 
effect. While viewing an object through magnifying 
 at YALE UNIV on July 22, 2013pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Paternalistic Vision 465
goggles, subjects who placed their hands next to the 
object so that they were visible through the goggles 
spontaneously reported that the object appeared to 
shrink before their eyes (supposedly because the object’s 
size had been “rescaled” to the subject’s “grasping abil-
ity”; Linkenauger et al., 2010). This so-called “illusory 
shrinkage” is an important finding worthy of closer 
empirical and theoretical attention.9 However, if the 
result’s interpretation is serious, then this finding vitiates, 
not vindicates, the scores of effects reported before it. No 
paternalistic vision study before or since has reported 
this kind of noticeable, dynamic change in apparent size, 
slant, or distance. This invites a straightforward question: 
Why not? Why do the other manipulations fail to induce 
subjectively appreciable, dynamic perceptual changes? 
And why do we ourselves not notice objects creeping 
closer when we imagine reaching them or drink Coca-
Cola? Before the illusory shrinkage study, such questions 
might have seemed somewhat inane, because there 
might have been hope left for an account of why we 
don’t notice paternalistic perceptual effects. But this find-
ing purports to demonstrate that the putative perceptual 
changes are noticeable—so noticeable, in fact, that 
observers say so without being asked. This directly 
undermines previous reports of (unnoticed) paternalistic 
perceptual effects, and it makes decisive our own failure 
to notice putatively frequent, substantial, paternalistic 
visual changes in everyday perceptual experience.
Accounting for the Findings
The foregoing discussion sought to engage the paternal-
istic vision hypothesis on its own terms, taking the rele-
vant empirical research at face value and identifying 
theoretical and nonexperimental difficulties facing the 
supporting theory. If these arguments have succeeded, 
then the dozens of studies reviewed thus far cannot be 
explained by paternalistic vision. What, then, accounts 
for them? This section offers a positive account of the 
findings typically cited in favor of the paternalistic vision 
hypothesis: Such effects actually reflect systematic biases 
in judgment rather than in perception.
Several empirical case studies will fuel this alternative 
account; however, it must first be acknowledged that a 
number of prominent findings reviewed earlier—including 
effects of backpacks, heavy balls, and tools on distance 
estimates—have not been replicable in other research 
laboratories. One such study sought to further investigate 
tool-use effects (Witt et al., 2005) with a new condition 
and task but instead failed to find the original effect 
of baton-holding on distance estimates (de Grave et al., 
2011). Another examined whether size judgments 
and triangulated walking measures would corroborate 
backpack-induced compressions in verbal distance esti-
mates (Proffitt et al., 2003) but instead found no 
distance-compression effects for any measure (including 
verbal estimates; Hutchison & Loomis, 2006a, 2006b; 
Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2006a, 2006b). 
Others have scrutinized more recent “indirect” findings 
(Ontiveros, Mejia, Liebenson, Lagos, & Durgin, 2011; Witt, 
2011b). And in an especially comprehensive replication 
attempt, Woods, Philbeck, and Danoff (2009) ran one 
replication of Proffitt et al. (2003) and three replications 
of Witt et al. (2004), failing to find the predicted effect in 
all cases. Such investigations unavoidably bear on any 
positive assessment of the paternalistic vision findings; 
wrestling over theoretical details is of little use if the find-
ings fail to survive empirical scrutiny. However, the pater-
nalistic vision hypothesis wears thick empirical armor 
and has scores of findings to its name (several of which 
have indeed been replicated10). It is for this reason that a 
comprehensive, generalizable, alternative account is 
needed. Fortunately, further empirical evidence points 
directly to such an account.
Judgment, not perception: Task 
demands
In perhaps the single most important finding pertaining 
to the dispute over paternalistic vision, Durgin et al. 
(2009) ran a version of the classic backpack/slant experi-
ment (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), adding to the two usual 
conditions (backpack and no backpack) a third condition 
in which subjects wore a backpack accompanied by a 
deceptive “cover story” about the backpack’s purpose. 
(The backpack allegedly contained electromyographic 
equipment to monitor ankle-flexion signals, and even 
included a whirring fan for effect.) Tellingly, merely pro-
viding this plausible alternative explanation for the back-
pack’s presence eliminated the effect of wearing a 
backpack on slant estimation. Subjects wearing unex-
plained backpacks indeed gave greater slant estimates 
than did those without backpacks, but subjects who wore 
a backpack accompanied by the deceptive cover story 
gave estimates indistinguishable from those of unencum-
bered subjects. The researchers concluded that subjects 
with unexplained backpacks sought—and found—a con-
nection between backpacks and perceived slant (nearly 
all subjects said so themselves in debriefing) and then 
complied with the demand to inflate their slant estimates. 
Subjects in the cover-story condition, however, were sat-
isfied with the reason offered for the backpack’s pres-
ence and so pursued no such link. This suggests that 
backpack effects and related findings could be products 
of demand characteristics—the implicit cueing of experi-
mental predictions to subjects, by experimenters or by 
the task itself—rather than effects of effort or ability on 
spatial perception.
It has been protested (Proffitt, 2009; Witt, 2011a; also 
Goldman, 2012) that Durgin et al.’s (2009) use of a 2-m 
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wooden ramp rather than an expansive hill invalidates 
any general conclusions inferable from the study, because 
“the relative difference in the amount of energy required 
to walk 1 m [i.e., halfway] up a ramp with and without 
the backpack is probably not enough to produce a reli-
able change in perception” (Witt, 2011a, p. 203). However, 
this line of criticism is misplaced. Durgin et al. were not 
attempting to replicate the original backpack study; they 
were simply trying to show that offering subjects unex-
plained backpacks and asking for slant estimates bears 
substantial experimental demand that can bias those esti-
mates and is therefore a burden-shifting confound that 
must be controlled for (see also Russell & Durgin, 2008; 
at any rate, subjects in real-hill experiments also say they 
believe the backpack is supposed to inflate slant esti-
mates; Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams, 2012). 
And at this they surely succeeded, first by successfully 
finding a backpack effect on slant judgments—with a 
measly ramp, no less!—and then eliminating that effect 
using their clever demand-reduction manipulation. 
Whether climbing the ramp would have been taxing 
enough to elicit a paternalistic perceptual effect is beside 
the point, which is that unexplained backpacks bias slant 
estimates.11
Demand has since been shown to make the difference 
in several additional cases. For example, explicitly inform-
ing backpack-wearing subjects about compliance effects 
eliminates the backpack’s influence on slant estimates, 
even for real-world hills (Durgin et al., 2012). And when 
climbing effort is manipulated but demand is not—by 
having subjects estimate the slant of either a staircase or 
an escalator—no effect of required effort is found (Shaffer 
& Flint, 2011). Conversely, manipulating belief but not 
ability affects spatial judgments in just the way one would 
expect if demand explained the results. For example, 
falsely informing subjects that a recently ingested diet 
soda was in fact sugary decreases slant estimates 
(Williams, Ciborowski, & Durgin, 2012), telling subjects 
that a golf club once belonged to a famous golfer 
increases estimates of golf-hole size in a putting task (C. 
Lee, Linkenauger, Bakdash, Joy-Gaba, & Proffitt, 2011), 
and telling subjects that some darts to be thrown at a 
target are actually defective eliminates the correlation 
between throwing accuracy and size estimation (Wesp & 
Gasper, 2012). The demand account earns even further 
support from a more unlikely source. When backpack-
wearing subjects were found to give shallower slant esti-
mates with close friends nearby than when alone, the 
preferred interpretation was an effect of “psychosocial 
resources” on perceived slant (Schnall et al., 2008). 
Although this was already a somewhat incongruous 
explanation (psychosocial resources, of course, do not 
actually improve hill-climbing ability), Durgin et al. (2009) 
note that this finding may more parsimoniously favor the 
demand account: The social support of a friend may have 
simply reduced the pressure to go along with the experi-
mental demand of wearing a backpack (see Asch, 1956).
Most paternalistic vision studies give ample reason to 
worry about this alternative account’s reach. Consider, for 
example, the investigations of athletic skill and size judg-
ments of sporting equipment. These experiments had no 
manipulations to speak of—each subject performed the 
same task and made the same judgment. Moreover, the 
observed effects show what Witt (2011a) calls “functional 
specificity,” in that “the direction of the effect is specific 
to the goal of the task” (p. 204). For example, softballs 
look bigger to hot-hitting batters, but tennis nets look 
smaller to successful tennis players (although see Cañal-
Bruland & van der Kamp, 2009). Could even these find-
ings be explained by demand and response bias? As noted 
in these articles’ introductions, these experiments—and, 
crucially, their hypotheses—were inspired by the relevant 
sport’s respective folklore. For example, Witt and Proffitt 
(2005) quote a hall-of-fame baseball player who remarked 
that a cold streak at the plate feels like “swinging at aspi-
rins.” But such quotes (although not unambiguously 
about spatial perception in the first place) actually favor 
the demand account: If a piece of sport legend is popular 
enough to motivate experimental hypotheses, then surely 
the experimental subjects themselves (who actually play 
the sport) can generate such hypotheses, too. There is 
every reason to think, then, that demand should be 
equally “functionally specific” in these studies and could 
bias responses accordingly.
Indeed, it is difficult to find a paternalistic vision study 
not susceptible to this alternative account, including even 
those that explicitly defend against it. Consider, for exam-
ple, that wielding a baton reduced distance estimates 
only if subjects actually used the baton to reach, which 
prompted the conclusion that “tool-use affects perceived 
distance, but only when you intend to use it” (Witt et al., 
2005, p. 880). Witt (2011a) asserts that “It is difficult to 
account for these results with a nonperceptual explana-
tion. For example, why would subjects have adjusted 
their distance judgments when holding and reaching 
[with] the tool but not when just holding the tool?” 
(p. 204). But a demand-based account of these findings 
could be quite straightforward. For example, confounded 
with subjects’ intentions to reach were the experimenter’s 
instructions to reach—subjects who simply held the 
baton and made distance estimates were never told what 
the baton was for. Once subjects were told to use the 
baton for reaching, however, the hypothesized connec-
tion between the two became clear, and the demand 
took effect.12
To be sure, the possibility that demand could contami-
nate spatial judgments has been acknowledged for some 
time (e.g., Proffitt et al., 2003), and several steps have 
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since been taken to control for such factors. One promis-
ing defense against demand, as Witt (2011a) rightly sug-
gests, is the use of “opaque manipulations” (p. 204) that 
do not telegraph the subject’s experimental condition or 
the experimenters’ hypotheses about that condition. 
Unfortunately, this strategy has foundered in practice. 
Witt cites the study of sugar consumption and slant judg-
ment as such an opaque manipulation: Subjects drank 
either a sugary beverage or an artificially sweetened bev-
erage, and there were between-group differences in slant 
estimates despite evidence that subjects could not iden-
tify their drink condition (Schnall et al., 2010). However, 
omitted from later discussions of these findings (e.g., 
Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a) is that subjects 
in the sugar experiments wore heavy backpacks during 
slant estimation. We know that this creates demand to 
inflate slant estimates; perhaps, then, sugar-depleted sub-
jects were just more likely to feebly go along with such 
demand or at least were more likely to judge the back-
pack as more burdensome and so more severely inflate 
their estimates. Conveniently, exactly this hypothesis was 
recently confirmed. Although drinking a sugary beverage 
indeed lowers backpack-wearers’ slant estimates, instruct-
ing subjects to ignore the backpack eliminates the effect 
of sugar consumption on slant judgments (Durgin et al., 
2012)—just as predicted by an alternative account appeal-
ing to compliance with backpack-induced demand. Even 
when steps were taken to control for demand and 
response bias, they crept in and undermined what might 
otherwise have been compelling findings (see also 
Ontiveros et al., 2011, and Witt, 2011b, on indirect 
measures).
Judgment, not perception: Affordances 
and action-plans
Spatial judgments may also be biased by factors more 
subtle than the unintentional communication of an 
experimental hypothesis. One empirical study that speaks 
to the influence of such factors could extend a judgment 
account to nearly every paternalistic vision finding 
reviewed so far. In a fifth experiment, Woods et al. (2009) 
deviated from exact replication of the ball-throwing 
experiments by giving three groups of subjects different 
criteria upon which to base their distance judgments: 
(a) “Objective distance” (“Base your response on how far 
away you think the object really is”), (b) “Apparent dis-
tance” (“Base your response on how far away the object 
visually appears”), and (c) “Nonvisual factors” (“Base 
your response on how far away you feel the object is, 
taking all nonvisual factors into account”). At last, an 
effect of heavy-ball-throwing on distance judgments was 
observed—but only in the nonvisual factors condition.
It is not quite clear what it should mean for an object 
to “feel” some distance away (although it is clear enough 
what this does not mean, given the null findings for 
objective and apparent distance). However, one intuitive 
way to interpret “felt distance” could be through Gibson’s 
(1979) theory of affordances (see also Chemero, 2001, 
2003). Affordances are opportunities for action in the 
environment, and they include the climbability of hills, 
the walkability of ground-surface extents, and even the 
“throw-to-ability” of targets; crucially, however, affor-
dances are distinct from lower-level visual properties 
such as size, distance, slant, or location. This should be 
fairly intuitive: A hill can seem less climbable without 
actually looking any steeper (i.e., without appearing to 
rise more degrees from horizontal). One way to interpret 
the nonvisual factors finding, then, is that heavy balls and 
backpacks did indeed change subjects’ impressions of 
their environments—but only of their environments’ 
affordances, not their spatial layout. These subjects were 
then eager to give voice to their changed impressions 
and so used the spatial estimation task to express them 
(because that task was all they were offered; see Loomis 
& Philbeck, 2008). In that case, subjects in nearly every 
one of the paternalistic vision studies could have been 
responding similarly, basing their estimates on felt slant, 
felt size, felt height, etc., rather than on the perceived 
spatial layout of their environments.
Indeed, it is possible along similar lines to concede 
that action considerations contribute to some paternalis-
tic vision effects without at all conceding that such effects 
are perceptual. For example, consider a recent empirical 
claim that effort-based distance-compression effects must 
be effects on perception rather than on judgment, 
response, or other postperceptual processes. Adapting 
subjects to reduced optic flow on a treadmill has been 
shown previously to increase verbal estimates of distance 
(supposedly by increasing anticipated walking effort; 
Proffitt et al., 2003). In a follow-up study (Witt, Proffitt, 
et al., 2010), two groups of subjects underwent the tread-
mill adaptation, but each was given different instructions: 
One group was told they would look at a target, close 
their eyes, and then “blind-walk” to wherever they 
remembered the target to be; the other group was told 
they would look at the same target, close their eyes, and 
then “blind-throw” a ball to wherever they remembered 
the target to be. The trick was that although the first 
group was in fact asked to walk after closing their eyes, 
the second group (the ostensible throwers) was told after 
they closed their eyes that there had been a mistake and 
that they too would actually blind-walk to the target. In 
other words, although both groups underwent the tread-
mill adaptation and then walked to the target, only one 
group viewed the target while expecting to walk, whereas 
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the other group viewed the target expecting to throw. 
The results showed that the walker group walked far-
thest, suggesting that the treadmill manipulation affected 
only them. It was then concluded that
This result demonstrates that effort and intention 
affect perception directly. If effort and intention  
had exerted their effects during postperceptual 
processes, both groups would have walked equally 
far because both groups experienced the same 
effort manipulation and both groups intended to 
walk at the time that their response was generated. 
(Witt, Proffitt, et al., 2010, p. 1158; see also Goldman, 
2012)
But the result demonstrates no such thing. Perhaps it 
shows that the estimation bias was introduced while the 
subjects’ eyes were open, and not afterward—but that 
does not at all entail that the bias was perceptual in 
nature. First, note that to complete a blind-walking task is 
just to walk some remembered distance; this result, then, 
could simply be an effect on remembered distance, rather 
than on perceived distance (see especially Cooper, 
Sterling, Bacon, & Bridgeman, 2012). But second, note 
also that subjects in Witt, Proffitt, et al.’s (2010) experi-
ment did not know they were estimating distance—all 
they knew about was their task to blind-walk or blind-
throw to a target. Although this is often an experimental 
advantage (see Loomis & Philbeck, 2008), here it intro-
duces a plain route toward explaining this effect through 
factors other than perception—in particular, as an effect 
on action planning rather than on distance perception. 
Suppose that, while looking at the target, the expectant 
walkers prepared for their upcoming task in the most 
natural way: They imagined how long it would take to 
walk to the target, so that they could subsequently walk 
for as long as they had imagined walking. However, their 
imagined walks—not their perceptions of distance—
were affected by the treadmill adaptation, so that when 
they completed the walking task, they ended up walking 
farther. Meanwhile, the throwers imagined how hard they 
would have to throw, but their imagined throws were 
unaffected by the treadmill adaptation, and so their sub-
sequent walks (which they had not imagined) remained 
similarly unaffected, and they did not walk as far. Such an 
account allows action-based factors to play a role in gen-
erating the effect but does not at all require that the target 
ever actually looked farther away. Instead, the locus of 
the effect is in preparing an action on the basis of an 
(unchanged) perceptual experience of distance, and then 
responding on the basis of that prepared action.
Other paternalistic vision findings may of course admit 
of more particular alternative interpretations having to do 
with specific methodological details, but accounts such 
as those reviewed earlier are easily generated for nearly 
all the paternalistic vision findings. Until future experi-
ments definitively rule out accounts such as those articu-
lated here, it will remain eminently plausible that 
judgment, memory, and response—not perception—
explain the paternalistic vision findings. For in every case 
so far that such alternative interpretations have been 
tested (e.g., Cooper et al., 2012; Durgin et al., 2009; 
Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, & Stigliani, 2010; Durgin et al., 
2012; Shaffer & Flint, 2011; Woods et al., 2009), they have 
been vindicated.
Conclusion
“I know it works in practice,” goes a new spin on an old 
saw, “but will it work in theory?” Although the paternalis-
tic vision hypothesis may seem to unify and explain an 
impressively broad collection of findings, I have argued 
that it cannot be the right theory of the results typically 
adduced in its favor. Any sufficiently ungrounded theory 
can seem to parsimoniously account for a large and 
otherwise-disparate set of empirical data. But although 
there do exist compelling, generalizable, empirically sup-
ported alternative accounts of those data—indeed, every 
time such an alternative account has been sought, it has 
been found—the deepest shortcoming of the paternalis-
tic vision hypothesis is not that the weight of the empiri-
cal evidence is against it (though this may indeed be the 
case). Rather, it never could have been the right account 
of the relevant results in the first place. It is just the wrong 
kind of theory for the job.
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Notes
 1. This well-known view has for too long gone without an 
appropriately memorable name. Though sometimes called 
embodied perception (Proffitt, 2006b), action-specific percep-
tion (Proffitt, 2008; Witt, 2011a), or perception as a phenotypic 
expression (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013), these labels conflate 
several nonidentical perspectives and may also mischaracterize 
the breadth of the relevant empirical findings, not all of which 
pertain to bodies, actions, or phenotypes. Thanks to Susanna 
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Siegel for first using the adjective “paternalistic” to artfully cap-
ture the suite of findings and views discussed here.
 2. The comparison is given here in terms of grade (rise/run) 
rather than angle (degrees) because Schnall, Zadra, and Proffitt 
(2010) used an extraordinarily steep hill: At 29° (a 55% grade), 
it was steeper on average than a typical route up Mount Everest 
(e.g., Hamill, 2012). The challenge imposed by each additional 
degree varies with a surface’s steepness, so comparisons in 
degrees may mislead for such slants.
 3. Alternatively, the incommensurability problem could be 
one horn of a dilemma. If action-specific perceptual units are 
incommensurable, then the problem goes through as described; 
if not, a new problem arises. For reasons skipped over earlier, 
it has been claimed that motor simulations mediate paternalistic 
perceptual effects, such that, for example, simulating reaching 
an object with a baton is necessary and sufficient to make the 
object look closer (Witt & Proffitt, 2008). Most discussions of 
motor simulations (including Witt, Kemmerer, Linkenauger, & 
Culham, 2010) assume that (a) multiple simulations can run in 
parallel and (b) such simulations are often irresistibly triggered 
by apparent opportunities for action. (A nice illustration of each 
is the finding that people use a wider grip-aperture to grasp a 
small cherry if a larger apple is also in view; Castiello, 1996.) 
These features of motor simulations conspire against paternal-
istic vision. Consider someone in the circumstances given by 
Proffitt (2006b, p. 114), deliberating over whether to run, jog, 
walk, or saunter to some destination while minimizing energy 
expenditure. Given points a and b, this person will run par-
allel simulations of each action; how, then, should the world 
look once the various parallel motor simulations (running, jog-
ging, walking, sauntering) have run to completion? Suppose 
the perceiver puts on footwear that makes walking easier and 
running harder. Should the destination look closer (walking) 
or farther (running)? Somewhere in between? If different per-
ceptual rulers use different perceptual units, then perhaps it is 
no contradiction to represent a spatial extent as some number 
of walking-units long and some other number of running-units 
long. But if perceptual rulers share units (e.g., required energy 
expenditure), then there is no way the world could look that 
would communicate one action’s advantage over another; spa-
tial perception just cannot work that way. (Note that Zadra et 
al.’s 2011 investigation of serially ordered actions is orthogonal 
to this issue.)
 4. More precisely, (A + B)/B = (tan(D) + tan(E))/tan(E), but 
when size is small relative to viewing distance, Eq. 1 is approxi-
mately correct (and is the standard presentation of horizon-
ratio scaling).
 5. It is sometimes hinted that ability scaling could be made 
possible by learning to relate optical information to one’s abili-
ties—for example, associating patterns of optic flow with walk-
ing costs (Linkenauger, Witt, et al., 2011; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 
2013; Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003; Witt, Proffitt, 
et al., 2010). Although the details of how such associations are 
structured or how they will actually enable ability scaling are 
never elaborated, any account founded on such learning is pre-
emptively ruled out by the success of manipulations for which 
such learning would have been impossible or unlikely. On the 
one hand, if learning refers to recalibration to manipulated 
abilities, then even the classic backpack/slant study is a coun-
terexample: Despite the fact that “all subjects arrived at the 
hill without the backpack and were given no opportunity to 
walk while wearing it” (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999, p. 1081), the 
manipulation successfully influenced slant judgments. On the 
other hand, if the relevant learning involves developing such 
perception-ability mappings in the first place (e.g., learning to 
associate optical information with effort or ability) and occurs 
over a considerable time period (as suggested by Proffitt & 
Linkenauger’s brief review of infant perceptual-motor develop-
ment), then counterexamples exist in the many studies of unfa-
miliar actions that would not have been sufficiently learned or 
practiced. Such actions include dart dropping (Wesp, Cichello, 
Gracia, & Davis, 2004), Pong playing (most subjects reported no 
experience with the game; Witt & Sugovic, 2010; see also Witt & 
Sugovic, 2012), and field-goal kicking (22 of 23 subjects reported 
having never kicked a field goal before, and steps were taken to 
ensure that all subjects “would not receive any visual feedback 
on their ability to kick successfully” during a short warm-up 
phase; Witt & Dorsch, 2009, p. 1331), among others. Evidently, 
the relevant actions had rarely (if ever) been performed, and 
yet the manipulations succeeded. And of course, learning to 
pair actions with optical information could never explain, for 
example, influences of social support and fear on judgments 
of slant and height—or, especially, results of a study in which 
subjects aimed a nonfunctional laser pointer at a distant object 
and imagined that it was functional, which involves no actions, 
no optical changes, and no ability manipulations, and yet still 
affected distance estimates (Davoli, Brockmole, & Witt, 2012).
 6. Effects of imagination also intensify earlier worries about 
paternalistic vision’s purported adaptive advantages. Perceivers 
cannot actually wield imagined batons; but barring some as-
yet-unspecified mechanism to distinguish the perceptual effects 
of real action capabilities from wished ones, what is to stop 
someone from acting on his or her imagined baton-augmented 
reach?
 7. The outlook for ability scaling is worse still—it may be dis-
confirmed by the paternalistic vision data themselves. It has 
been reported that individual differences in age and fitness 
correlate with verbal estimates of slant and distance, such that 
when asked a question like “How far away, in feet and inches, 
does that cone look?”, obese or older individuals give greater 
estimates than fit or younger individuals do (Sugovic & Witt, 
2011, 2013; mutatis mutandis for slant and degrees—Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999; see also Witt, Schuck, & Taylor, 2011). But such 
results should perplex any “scaling” theorist. Consider eye-
height scaling: Even if two people, one short and one tall, expe-
rience objects as different amounts of eye-level units in size, 
they should still verbally agree about an object’s size in feet, 
because the word “foot” should pick out a correspondingly dif-
ferent amount of body-scaled units for each of them. (How else 
could we all manage to get just what we expect when ordering 
foot-long hot dogs or sandwiches, our differently sized percep-
tual rulers notwithstanding?) But then the same logic should 
apply to, for example, fitness level: Even if obese individuals 
experience a target as “more calories away” than fitter people 
do, all parties should still verbally agree about the target’s dis-
tance in feet—against these empirical findings. (See Firestone, 
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in press, and Firestone & Scholl, in press, for more detailed 
expositions of this objection’s logic, which is related to the “El 
Greco fallacy.”)
 8. Note that it will not vindicate a theory of paternalistic spatial 
perception if, for example, drinking Coca-Cola merely makes 
hills look more climbable or otherwise affects their perceived 
affordances. To corroborate paternalistic vision, hills must gen-
uinely appear to rise fewer degrees from horizontal and look 
shallower.
 9. My suspicion is that this is not a paternalistic effect to begin 
with, regardless of whether it turns out to be perceptual (see 
also Linkenauger, Mohler, & Proffitt, 2011). The illusory shrink-
age study diverges from most other paternalistic vision studies 
in that its effect requires actually viewing one’s manipulated 
body. This diminishes the finding’s force as a case study of 
paternalistic vision, in part because visual effects of visual 
manipulations are much more easily accommodated by a mod-
ular view of perception.
10. See, for example, Firestone and Scholl (in press), who twice 
replicate effects of rod-holding on width estimates (Stefanucci 
& Geuss, 2009)—albeit in circumstances that demonstrate that 
this effect must not be perceptual.
11. More on-target is Proffitt’s (2009) response that, in the ear-
lier effort and fatigue studies (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, 
Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995), a third, haptic measure 
of perceived slant—in which a waist-high, unseen palm board 
is manually adjusted to haptically match the hill’s visually per-
ceived slant—was unaffected by backpack-wearing or exercise 
(see also Creem-Regehr, Gooch, Sahm, & Thompson, 2004; Witt 
& Proffitt, 2007). If backpacks bias slant estimates, that response 
goes, then why weren’t palm-board estimates biased as well? 
However, Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, and Stigliani (2010) meticu-
lously and compellingly dismantle this objection, demonstrating 
(among many relevant findings) that palm-board estimates are 
unusually variable and noise-susceptible, but that when palm-
board estimates from the two fatigue experiments are analyzed 
together, the combined data do indicate a statistically reliable 
fatigue effect (see also Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, & Stigliani, 
2011; Proffitt & Zadra, 2011).
12. Ontiveros, Mejia, Liebenson, Lagos, and Durgin (2011) also 
ask whether distance-compression effects of tool use could 
be explained by biases in the hand-only control conditions. 
Reach is systematically overestimated (Fischer, 2005); perhaps, 
then, attempting (and failing) to reach a target with only a 
hand increased distance estimates in that condition, giving the 
appearance of a tool-use compression effect only because the 
tool conditions (real, anticipated, and imagined) were com-
pared to an inflated baseline.
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